Posts Tagged ‘ Philosophy of Statistics ’

“Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: where should they meet?”

June 14, 2014
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“Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: where should they meet?”

Four score years ago (!) we held the conference “Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do (Should) They meet?” at the London School of Economics, Center for the Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, CPNSS, where I’m visiting professor [1] Many of the discussions on this blog grew out of contributions from the conference, and conversations […]

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Severe osteometric probing of skeletal remains: John Byrd

March 28, 2014
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Severe osteometric probing of skeletal remains: John Byrd

John E. Byrd, Ph.D. D-ABFA Central Identification Laboratory JPAC Guest, March 27, PHil 6334 “Statistical Considerations of the Histomorphometric Test Protocol for Determination of Human Origin of Skeletal Remains”  By: John E. Byrd, Ph.D...

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The Unexpected Way Philosophy Majors Are Changing The World Of Business

March 25, 2014
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The Unexpected Way Philosophy Majors Are Changing The World Of Business

  “Philosophy majors rule” according to this recent article. We philosophers should be getting the word out. Admittedly, the type of people inclined to do well in philosophy are already likely to succeed in analytic areas. Coupled with the chuzpah of taking up an “outmoded and impractical” major like philosophy in the first place, innovative tendencies […]

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Significance tests and frequentist principles of evidence: Phil6334 Day #6

March 2, 2014
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Significance tests and frequentist principles of evidence: Phil6334 Day #6

Slides (2 sets) from Phil 6334 2/27/14 class (Day#6). D. Mayo: “Frequentist Statistics as a Theory of Inductive Inference” A. Spanos “Probability/Statistics Lecture Notes 4: Hypothesis Testing” Filed under: P-values, Phil 633...

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Phil 6334: Day #2 Slides

February 1, 2014
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Phil 6334: Day #2 Slides

  Day #2, Part 1: D. Mayo:  Class, Part 2: A. Spanos: Probability/Statistics Lecture Notes 1: Introduction to Probability and Statistical Inference Day #1 slides are here.Filed under: Phil 6334 class material, Philosophy of Statistics, Statistics

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BOSTON COLLOQUIUM FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: Revisiting the Foundations of Statistics

January 29, 2014
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BOSTON COLLOQUIUM FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE:  Revisiting the Foundations of Statistics

BOSTON COLLOQUIUM FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2013–2014 54th Annual Program Download the 54th Annual Program REVISITING THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS IN THE ERA OF BIG DATA: SCALING UP TO MEET THE CHALLENGE Cosponsored by the Department of Mathematics & Statistics at Boston University. Friday, February 21, 2014 10 a.m. – 5:30 p.m. Photonics Center, 9th Floor Colloquium […]

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Phil 6334: Slides from Day #1: Four Waves in Philosophy of Statistics

January 24, 2014
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Phil 6334: Slides from Day #1: Four Waves in Philosophy of Statistics

First installment 6334 syllabus (Mayo and Spanos) D. Mayo slides from Day #1: Jan 23, 2014   I will post seminar slides here (they will generally be ragtag affairs), links to the papers are in the syllabus.Filed under: Phil 6334 class material, Phi...

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More on deconstructing Larry Wasserman (Aris Spanos)

December 28, 2013
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More on deconstructing Larry Wasserman (Aris Spanos)

This follows up on yesterday’s deconstruction:  Aris Spanos (2012)[i] – Comments on: L. Wasserman “Low Assumptions, High Dimensions” (2011)* I’m happy to play devil’s advocate in commenting on Larry’s very interesting and provocative (in a good way) paper on ‘how recent developments in statistical modeling and inference have [a] changed the intended scope of data analysis, […]

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Deconstructing Larry Wasserman

December 28, 2013
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Deconstructing Larry Wasserman

 Larry Wasserman (“Normal Deviate”) has announced he will stop blogging (for now at least). That means we’re losing one of the wisest blog-voices on issues relevant to statistical foundations (among many other areas in statistics). Whether this lures him back or reaffirms his decision to stay away, I thought I’d reblog my (2012) “deconstruction” of […]

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Bayesian Confirmation Philosophy and the Tacking Paradox (iv)*

October 20, 2013
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Bayesian Confirmation Philosophy and the Tacking Paradox (iv)*

*addition of note [2]. A long-running research program in philosophy is to seek a quantitative measure C(h,x) to capture intuitive ideas about “confirmation” and about “confirmational relevance”. The components of C(h,x) are allowed to be any statements, no reference to a probability model or to joint distributions are required. Then h is “confirmed” or supported […]

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