Also Smith and Jones[1] by Stephen Senn Head of Competence Center for Methodology and Statistics (CCMS) This story is based on a paradox proposed to me by Don Berry. I have my own opinion on this but I find that opinion boring and predictable. The opinion of others is much more interesting and so [...]
Defending Birnbaum’s Proof Greg Gandenberger PhD student, History and Philosophy of Science Master’s student, Statistics University of Pittsburgh In her 1996 Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, Professor Mayo argued against the Likelihood Principle on the grounds that it does not allow one to control long-run error rates in the way that frequentist methods do. [...]
Defending Birnbaum’s Proof Greg Gandenberger PhD student, History and Philosophy of Science Master’s student, Statistics University of Pittsburgh In her 1996 Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, Professor Mayo argued against the Likelihood Principle on the grounds that it does not allow one to control long-run error rates in the way that frequentist methods do. [...]
Some weeks ago I discovered an error* in the upper severity bounds for the one-sided Normal test in section 5 of: “Statistical Science Meets Philosophy of Science Part 2″ SS & POS 2. The published article has been corrected. The error was in section 5.3, but I am blogging all of 5. (* μo was written [...]
In view of some questions about “behavioristic” vs “evidential” construals of frequentist statistics (from the last post), and how the error statistical philosophy tries to improve on Birnbaum’s attempt at providing the latter, I’m reblogging a portion of a post from Nov. 5, 2011 when I also happened to be in London. (The beginning just records [...]
What I like best about Wasserman’s blogpost (Normal Deviate) is his clear denial that merely using conditional probability makes the method Bayesian (even if one chooses to call the conditional probability theorem Bayes’s theorem, and even if one is using ‘Bayes’s’ nets). Else any use of probability theory is Bayesian, which trivializes the whole issue. [...]
Here is the final section (7) of my new paper: “Statistical Science Meets Philosophy of Science Part 2” SS & POS 2.* Section 6 is in my last post. 7. Can/Should Bayesian and Error Statistical Philosophies Be Reconciled? Stephen Senn makes a rather startling but doubtlessly true remark: The late and great George Barnard, through his [...]
Here is section 5 of my new paper: “Statistical Science Meets Philosophy of Science Part 2: Shallow versus Deep Explorations” SS & POS 2. Sections 1 and 2 are in my last post.* 5. The Error-Statistical Philosophy I recommend moving away, once and for all, from the idea that frequentists must ‘sign up’ for either Neyman [...]
I was reviewing blog comments and various links people have sent me. I have noticed a kind of comment often arises about a type of (subjective?) Bayesian who does not assign probabilities to a general hypothesis H but only to observable events. In this way, it is claimed, one can avoid various criticisms but retain [...]
A new article of mine, “Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science Part 2: Shallow versus Deep Explorations” has been published in the on-line journal, Rationality, Markets, and Morals (Special Topic: Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do/Should They Meet?”). The contributions to this special volume began with the conference we ran in June 2010. [...]
