John E. Byrd, Ph.D. D-ABFA Central Identification Laboratory JPAC Guest, March 27, PHil 6334 “Statistical Considerations of the Histomorphometric Test Protocol for Determination of Human Origin of Skeletal Remains” By: John E. Byrd, Ph.D...

“Philosophy majors rule” according to this recent article. We philosophers should be getting the word out. Admittedly, the type of people inclined to do well in philosophy are already likely to succeed in analytic areas. Coupled with the chuzpah of taking up an “outmoded and impractical” major like philosophy in the first place, innovative tendencies […]

BOSTON COLLOQUIUM FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2013–2014 54th Annual Program Download the 54th Annual Program REVISITING THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS IN THE ERA OF BIG DATA: SCALING UP TO MEET THE CHALLENGE Cosponsored by the Department of Mathematics & Statistics at Boston University. Friday, February 21, 2014 10 a.m. – 5:30 p.m. Photonics Center, 9th Floor Colloquium […]

This follows up on yesterday’s deconstruction: Aris Spanos (2012)[i] – Comments on: L. Wasserman “Low Assumptions, High Dimensions” (2011)* I’m happy to play devil’s advocate in commenting on Larry’s very interesting and provocative (in a good way) paper on ‘how recent developments in statistical modeling and inference have [a] changed the intended scope of data analysis, […]

Larry Wasserman (“Normal Deviate”) has announced he will stop blogging (for now at least). That means we’re losing one of the wisest blog-voices on issues relevant to statistical foundations (among many other areas in statistics). Whether this lures him back or reaffirms his decision to stay away, I thought I’d reblog my (2012) “deconstruction” of […]

*addition of note [2]. A long-running research program in philosophy is to seek a quantitative measure C(h,x) to capture intuitive ideas about “confirmation” and about “confirmational relevance”. The components of C(h,x) are allowed to be any statements, no reference to a probability model or to joint distributions are required. Then h is “confirmed” or supported […]

A reader asks: “Can you tell me about disagreements on numbers between a severity assessment within error statistics, and a Bayesian assessment of posterior probabilities?” Sure. There are differences between Bayesian posterior probabilities and formal error statistical measures, as well as between the latter and a severity (SEV) assessment, which differs from the standard type […]