Blog Archives

Bayesian Confirmation Philosophy and the Tacking Paradox (iv)*

October 20, 2013
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Bayesian Confirmation Philosophy and the Tacking Paradox (iv)*

*addition of note [2]. A long-running research program in philosophy is to seek a quantitative measure C(h,x) to capture intuitive ideas about “confirmation” and about “confirmational relevance”. The components of C(h,x) are allowed to be any statements, no reference to a probability model or to joint distributions are required. Then h is “confirmed” or supported […]

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Sir David Cox: a comment on the post, “Was Hosiasson pulling Jeffreys’ leg?”

October 12, 2013
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Sir David Cox: a comment on the post, “Was Hosiasson pulling Jeffreys’ leg?”

David Cox sent me a letter relating to my post of Oct.5, 2013. He has his own theory as to who might have been doing the teasing! I’m posting it  here, with his permission:  Dear Deborah I was interested to see the correspondence about Jeffreys and the possible teasing by Neyman’s associate. It brought a […]

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Blog Contents: August 2013

September 27, 2013
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Blog Contents: August 2013

August 2013 (8/1) Blogging (flogging?) the SLP: Response to Reply- Xi’an Robert (8/5) At the JSM: 2013 International Year of Statistics (8/6) What did Nate Silver just say? Blogging the JSM (8/9) 11th bullet, multiple choice question, and last thoughts on the JSM (8/11) E.S. Pearson: “Ideas came into my head as I sat on […]

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“When Bayesian Inference Shatters” Owhadi, Scovel, and Sullivan (guest post)

September 15, 2013
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“When Bayesian Inference Shatters” Owhadi, Scovel, and Sullivan (guest post)

I’m extremely grateful to Drs. Owhadi, Scovel and Sullivan for replying to my request for “a plain Jane” explication of their interesting paper, “When Bayesian Inference Shatters”, and especially for permission to post it. If readers want to ponder the paper awhile and send me comments for guest posts or “U-PHILS*” (by OCT 15), let […]

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(Part 2) Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis

September 11, 2013
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(Part 2) Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis

Continuation of “Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis” Deborah G. Mayo Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy, Volume 41, Number 2, 2005, pp. 299-319 Part 1 is here. There are two other points of confusion in critical discussions of the SCT, that we may note here: I. The […]

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Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis (Part I)

September 10, 2013
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Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis (Part I)

Today is C.S. Peirce’s birthday. I hadn’t blogged him before, but he’s one of my all time heroes. You should read him: he’s a treasure chest on essentially any topic. I’ll blog the main sections of a (2005) paper over the next few days. It’s written for a very general philosophical audience; the statistical parts […]

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Stephen Senn: Open Season (guest post)

September 5, 2013
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Stephen Senn: Open Season (guest post)

Stephen Senn Head, Methodology and Statistics Group, Competence Center for Methodology and Statistics (CCMS), Luxembourg “Open Season” The recent joint statement(1) by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) and the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations(EFPIA) represents a further step in what has been a slow journey towards (one assumes) will be […]

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Gelman’s response to my comment on Jaynes

September 4, 2013
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Gelman’s response to my comment on Jaynes

Gelman responds to the comment[i] I made on my 8/31/13 post: Popper and Jaynes Posted by Andrew on 3 September 2013 Deborah Mayo quotes me as saying, “Popper has argued (convincingly, in my opinion) that scientific inference is not inductive but deductive.” She then follows up with: Gelman employs significance test-type reasoning to reject a model when the data sufficiently disagree. […]

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Overheard at the comedy hour at the Bayesian retreat-2 years on

September 1, 2013
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Overheard at the comedy hour at the Bayesian retreat-2 years on

It’s nearly two years since I began this blog, and some are wondering if I’ve covered all the howlers thrust our way? Sadly, no. So since it’s Saturday night here at the Elba Room, let’s listen in on one of the more puzzling fallacies–one that I let my introductory logic students spot… “Did you hear […]

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Is being lonely unnatural for slim particles? A statistical argument

August 29, 2013
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Is being lonely unnatural for slim particles? A statistical argument

Being lonely is unnatural, at least if you are a slim Higgs particle (with mass on the order of the type recently discovered)–according to an intriguing statistical argument given by particle physicist Matt Strassler (sketched below). Strassler sets out “to explain the scientific argument as to why it is so unnatural to have a Higgs particle that is “lonely” — with no […]

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