Blog Archives

The Conversion of Subjective Bayesian, Colin Howson, & the problem of old evidence (i)

November 28, 2017
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The Conversion of Subjective Bayesian, Colin Howson, & the problem of old evidence (i)

“The subjective Bayesian theory as developed, for example, by Savage … cannot solve the deceptively simple but actually intractable old evidence problem, whence as a foundation for a logic of confirmation at any rate, it must be accounted a failure.” (Howson, (2017), p. 674) What? Did the “old evidence” problem cause Colin Howson to recently […]

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Statistical skepticism: How to use significance tests effectively: 7 challenges & how to respond to them

October 13, 2017
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Statistical skepticism: How to use significance tests effectively: 7 challenges & how to respond to them

Here are my slides from the ASA Symposium on Statistical Inference : “A World Beyond p < .05”  in the session, “What are the best uses for P-values?”. (Aside from me,our session included Yoav Benjamini and David Robinson, with chair: Nalini Ravishanker.) 7 QUESTIONS Why use a tool that infers from a single (arbitrary) P-value […]

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G.A. Barnard: The “catch-all” factor: probability vs likelihood

September 25, 2017
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G.A. Barnard: The “catch-all” factor: probability vs likelihood

  With continued acknowledgement of Barnard’s birthday on Friday, Sept.23, I reblog an exchange on catchall probabilities from the “The Savage Forum” (pp 79-84 Savage, 1962) with some new remarks.[i]   BARNARD:…Professor Savage, as I understand him, said earlier that a difference between likelihoods and probabilities was that probabilities would normalize because they integrate to one, whereas likelihoods […]

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Egon Pearson’s Heresy

August 25, 2017
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Egon Pearson’s Heresy

Here’s one last entry in honor of Egon Pearson’s birthday: “Statistical Concepts in Their Relation to Reality” (Pearson 1955). I’ve posted it several times over the years (6!), but always find a new gem or two, despite its being so short. E. Pearson rejected some of the familiar tenets that have come to be associated with […]

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Performance or Probativeness? E.S. Pearson’s Statistical Philosophy

August 16, 2017
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Performance or Probativeness?  E.S. Pearson’s Statistical Philosophy

This is a belated birthday post for E.S. Pearson (11 August 1895-12 June, 1980). It’s basically a post from 2012 which concerns an issue of interpretation (long-run performance vs probativeness) that’s badly confused these days. I’ll blog some E. Pearson items this week, including, my latest reflection on a historical anecdote regarding Egon and the woman he wanted […]

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Allan Birnbaum: Foundations of Probability and Statistics (27 May 1923 – 1 July 1976)

May 27, 2017
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Allan Birnbaum: Foundations of Probability and Statistics (27 May 1923 – 1 July 1976)

Today is Allan Birnbaum’s birthday. In honor of his birthday, I’m posting the articles in the Synthese volume that was dedicated to his memory in 1977. The editors describe it as their way of  “paying homage to Professor Birnbaum’s penetrating and stimulating work on the foundations of statistics”. I paste a few snippets from the articles by Giere […]

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3 YEARS AGO (APRIL 2014): MEMORY LANE

May 15, 2017
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3 YEARS AGO (APRIL 2014): MEMORY LANE

MONTHLY MEMORY LANE: 3 years ago: April 2014. I mark in red three posts from each month that seem most apt for general background on key issues in this blog, excluding those reblogged recently[1], and in green up to 4 others I’d recommend[2].  Posts that are part of a “unit” or a group count as one. For this month, I’ll include […]

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Jerzy Neyman and “Les Miserables Citations” (statistical theater in honor of his birthday)

April 18, 2017
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Jerzy Neyman and “Les Miserables Citations” (statistical theater in honor of his birthday)

For my final Jerzy Neyman item, here’s the post I wrote for his birthday last year:  A local acting group is putting on a short theater production based on a screenplay I wrote:  “Les Miserables Citations” (“Those Miserable Quotes”) [1]. The “miserable” citations are those everyone loves to cite, from their early joint 1933 paper: We are inclined to think that as […]

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Neyman: Distinguishing tests of statistical hypotheses and tests of significance might have been a lapse of someone’s pen

April 17, 2017
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Neyman: Distinguishing tests of statistical hypotheses and tests of significance might have been a lapse of someone’s pen

I’ll continue to post Neyman-related items this week in honor of his birthday. This isn’t the only paper in which Neyman makes it clear he denies a distinction between a test of  statistical hypotheses and significance tests. He and E. Pearson also discredit the myth that the former is only allowed to report pre-data, fixed error probabilities, and are […]

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If you’re seeing limb-sawing in P-value logic, you’re sawing off the limbs of reductio arguments

April 15, 2017
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If you’re seeing limb-sawing in P-value logic, you’re sawing off the limbs of reductio arguments

I was just reading a paper by Martin and Liu (2014) in which they allude to the “questionable logic of proving H0 false by using a calculation that assumes it is true”(p. 1704).  They say they seek to define a notion of “plausibility” that “fits the way practitioners use and interpret p-values: a small p-value means […]

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