I’ll continue to post Neyman-related items this week in honor of his birthday. This isn’t the only paper in which Neyman makes it clear he denies a distinction between a test of statistical hypotheses and significance tests. He and E. Pearson also discredit the myth that the former is only allowed to report pre-data, fixed error probabilities, and are […]
MONTHLY MEMORY LANE: 3 years ago: March 2014. I mark in red three posts from each month that seem most apt for general background on key issues in this blog, excluding those reblogged recently[1], and in green up to 4 others I’d recommend[2]. Posts that are part of a “unit” or a group count as one. 3/19 and 3/17 are one, […]
A famous chestnut given by Cox (1958) recently came up in conversation. The example “is now usually called the ‘weighing machine example,’ which draws attention to the need for conditioning, at least in certain types of problems” (Reid 1992, p. 582). When I describe it, you’ll find it hard to believe many regard it as causing an […]
Given all the recent attention given to kvetching about significance tests, it’s an apt time to reblog Aris Spanos’ overview of the error statistician talking back to the critics [1]. A related paper for your Saturday night reading is Mayo and Spanos (2011).[2] It mixes the error statistical philosophy of science with its philosophy of statistics, introduces severity, […]
Comments get unwieldy after 100, so here’s a chance to continue the “due to chance” discussion in some roomier quarters. (There seems to be at least two distinct lanes being travelled.) Now one of the main reasons I run this blog is to discover potential clues to solving or making progress on thorny philosophical problems I’ve been wrangling with for a […]
My invited comments on the ASA Document on P-values* The American Statistical Association is to be credited with opening up a discussion into p-values; now an examination of the foundations of other key statistical concepts is needed. Statistical significance tests are a small part of a rich set of “techniques for systematically appraising and bounding […]
Statistical Challenges in Assessing and Fostering the Reproducibility of Scientific Results I generally find National Academy of Science (NAS) manifestos highly informative. I only gave a quick reading to around 3/4 of this one. I thank Hilda Bastian for twittering the link. Before giving my impressions, I’m interested to hear what readers think, whenever you get around to having a […]
![Can’t Take the Fiducial Out of Fisher (if you want to understand the N-P performance philosophy) [i]](https://errorstatistics.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/imgres.jpg?w=148&h=181)
In recognition of R.A. Fisher’s birthday today, I’ve decided to share some thoughts on a topic that has so far has been absent from this blog: Fisher’s fiducial probability. Happy Birthday Fisher. [Neyman and Pearson] “began an influential collaboration initially designed primarily, it would seem to clarify Fisher’s writing. This led to their theory of […]
I’m reblogging Gelman’s post today: “Gathering of philosophers and physicists unaware of modern reconciliation of Bayes and Popper”. I concur with Gelman’s arguments against all Bayesian “inductive support” philosophies, and welcome the Gelman and Shalizi (2013) ‘meeting of the minds’ between an error statistical philosophy and Bayesian falsification (which I regard as a kind of error statistical Bayesianism). […]
Is it possible, today, to have a fair-minded engagement with debates over statistical foundations? I’m not sure, but I know it is becoming of pressing importance to try. Increasingly, people are getting serious about methodological reforms—some are quite welcome, others are quite radical. Too rarely do the reformers bring out the philosophical presuppositions of the criticisms and proposed […]
