Category: Statistical Inference as Severe Testing

severe testing or severe sabotage? Christian Roberts and the book slasher.

severe testing or severe sabotage? [not a book review]   I came across this anomaly on Christian Roberts’s blog.  Last week, I received this new book of Deborah Mayo, which I was looking forward reading and annotating!, but thrice alas, the book had been sabotaged: except for the preface and acknowledgements, the entire book is printed upside down [a […]

Excursion 2 Tour II (3rd stop): Falsification, Pseudoscience, Induction (2.3)

Where you are in the Journey*  We’ll move from the philosophical ground floor to connecting themes from other levels, from Popperian falsification to significance tests, and from Popper’s demarcation to current-day problems of pseudoscience and irreplication. An excerpt from our Museum Guide gives a broad-brush sketch of the first few sections of Tour II: Karl Popper […]

“It should never be true, though it is still often said that the conclusions are no more accurate than the data on which they are based”

My new book, Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: How to Get Beyond the Statistics Wars,” you might have discovered, includes Souvenirs throughout (A-Z). But there are some highlights within sections that might be missed in the excerpts I’m posting. One such “keepsake” is a quote from Fisher at the very end of Section 2.1.  These […]

Excursion 2: Taboos of Induction and Falsification: Tour I (first stop)

Where you are in the Journey*  Cox: [I]n some fields foundations do not seem very important, but we both think that foundations of statistical inference are important; why do you think that is? Mayo: I think because they ask about fundamental questions of evidence, inference, and probability … we invariably cross into philosophical questions about […]

Excursion 1 Tour I (3rd stop): The Current State of Play in Statistical Foundations: A View From a Hot-Air Balloon (1.3)

How can a discipline, central to science and to critical thinking, have two methodologies, two logics, two approaches that frequently give substantively different answers to the same problems? … Is complacency in the face of contradiction acceptable for a central discipline of science? (Donald Fraser 2011, p. 329) We [statisticians] are not blameless … we […]